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Abstract 
This essay takes as its point of departure a pair of perennial questions in western ethics: How might we 
know "the stranger"? What dictates proper behavior toward him or her? (Ogletree 1985) These ethical 
questions are also essential questions of culture, economics, law and diplomacy. They have inspired 
empathetic philosophical reflections, most notably in the work of Emmanuel Levinas (1969, 1998), 
theoretical work on difference, language, and subjectivity (Derrida 1998; Kristeva 1988), and literary 
explorations of human difference and alienation, most famously in Camus's The Stranger. ([1946] 1988; 
see also Stamelman on Jabes 1993) In Europe and North America, the treatment of the stranger who 
seeks refuge from political, cultural or sexual violence has surely been one of the signal ethical issues in 
immigration policy and foreign relations of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. (Sassen 1999: 
98-158) 
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"How can we define hospitality," the youngest disciple asked his teacher. "A definition is in 
itself restrictive, and hospitality does not admit of any limitation," replied the teacher. 
Edmond Jabes, Rainbow II 
 
 
This essay takes as its point of departure a pair of perennial questions in western ethics: How might we 
know "the stranger"? What dictates proper behavior toward him or her? (Ogletree 1985) These ethical 
questions are also essential questions of culture, economics, law and diplomacy. They have inspired 
empathetic philosophical reflections, most notably in the work of Emmanuel Levinas (1969, 1998), 
theoretical work on difference, language, and subjectivity (Derrida 1998; Kristeva 1988), and literary 
explorations of human difference and alienation, most famously in Camus's The Stranger. ([1946] 1988; 
see also Stamelman on Jabes 1993) In Europe and North America, the treatment of the stranger who 
seeks refuge from political, cultural or sexual violence has surely been one of the signal ethical issues 
in immigration policy and foreign relations of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. (Sassen 1999: 98-
158) 
 
The ethical question of the stranger and his or her welcome becomes particularly urgent--and perhaps 
particularly troubling--when the stranger appears as a figure of weakness and vulnerability, that is, 
when he or she looks less like an enemy than a possible dependent. While the political refugee is 
perhaps the most familiar incarnation of this figure (Noiriel 1991), the stranger marked by disease or 
physical disability often presents an even more disturbing challenge to the ethics of hospitality. (Kraut 
1994, Fairchild and Tynan 1994) As Susan Sontag reminds us, moreover, illness by definition 
estranges; it creates powerful borders between the sick and the well. It likewise estranges us from 
ourselves, as we are forced in times of affliction "to identify ourselves as citizens of that other place." 
(1978: 3) Hospitalization, reserved until relatively recently in western history for the indigent or those 
without kin or companions, brings with it a different order of confrontation with "the stranger," most 
prominently the stranger who tends to the sick in the place of their own families or communities. 
(Rosenberg 1987, Rothman 1991:127-47) In these ways, illness and hospitalization foreground the 
body as the historical site at which identity, an irresolvable question where the stranger is concerned, is 
both created and destroyed. 
 
For Levinas, the question of the stranger is most often posed as a matter of the constitution of the "I," 
the lone self who hears both the other's call and the call of "the third party" or "the one next to the 
other." (1998: 202) This essay, centered on the problem of the sick and destitute stranger in mid-
nineteenth century French legal and administrative reflections, does not directly follow Levinas in 
exploring an ethical relationship between the particular self and the other(s), but takes the question of 
hospitality and the ethical address of the other to the terrain of law and government. By entering this 
arena of study, I seeks to make visible governmental imagination engaged in constituting its "self" as it 
considers the limits of hospitality, in this instance, the varieties of what I shall call "medical hospitality" 
inscribed in the debates, laws and customs addressing the admission of the poor stranger to municipal 
hospitals. In examining national legislation and the bearing of that legislation on local officials in 
Marseilles--a French city with one of the longest and most complicated histories of confronting suffering 
and impoverished strangers--I trace the lineaments of the complex and often self-contradictory interior 
conversations of government, of corporate bodies talking to themselves about the how to craft and 
administer an officially regulated ethic of care that attends to the needs of the outsider while also 
protecting the perceived vulnerabilities of the host. 
 
Unlike Levinas's meditation on obligation of the "I" toward the other--where, as Jean-Francois Lyotard 
puts it, "the obligation in question does not result from an authority previously legitimated by me or by 
us" (1988: 112)--governmental confrontations with the ethics of medical hospitality are always 
predicated upon specific legal definitions, administrative languages, and jurisdictional landscapes. If the 
question of hospitality toward the poor outsider at first appears to be a perennial theme in western 
culture, as a matter of lawmaking, administration and the unfolding of official conversation, it must be 
addressed as a question that is always situated, its meaning located not in the transhistorical or 
metaphysical but in the particular, the local, and, at times, in the mundane. 
 
In this instance, I take mid-nineteenth century France as my particular terrain of inquiry. I do not, 
however, aim to provide a conventionally-framed history of this time and place, nor do I lead the reader 
through academic historians' debates on the interpretation of this moment in the French past that 
remain faithfully within the normative borders of the discipline. (on the policing of this border, see esp. 
Scott, 1998) Instead, I see in France of this period a compelling instance of a governmental struggle 
with hospitality that should be of broad interest to those concerned with the discourse and comportment 
of modern democracies as they face the suffering of all those officially classified as "outsiders." Further, 
France of the mid-nineteenth century provides a crucial vantage onto the construction of the 
conceptions and institutions of modern liberal government (Hazareesingh 1998), including the 
juridically-organized, bureaucratized, and increasingly medicalized government of poverty and health, 
that would serve as the bedrock both for future reflection on the care of the stranger and the actions 
those reflections inspired. This does not mean that I hope the reader will recognize his or her present 
fully incarnate in this historically-specific account. As Marianne Constable reminds us, inquiries staged 
in the past, and particularly those that allow for the past's inescapable alterity even when the reader 
might wish the author to approach this difference as "a gap to be bridged," (1994: 5) provide important 
opportunities to estrange ourselves from naturalized ways of talking and thinking about a given issue, 
and so, perhaps, begin to imagine otherwise. 
 
From this perspective, the history of the destitute and ailing stranger in nineteenth century France and 
the multiple problems of hospitality he posed--so familiar on the surface, so evidently apiece with an 
unchanging topos in western civilization--invites the reader to embark on the counter-intuitive and 
unaccustomed project of defamiliarizing the strange. As much as it might disconcert, this approach 
opens an especially productive route through past meditations on both the kind of difference the 
stranger has represented and the proper response to his or her arrival. It also allows us to consider the 
question of the host in ways that extends the scholarly study of government and strangers beyond the 
analysis of policy or the direct mapping of governmental behavior onto the accrued social or ethnic 
interests of the individuals charged with legislative or administrative responsibilities. In his reading of 
Nietzsche's reflections on history and genealogy, Michel Foucault argued that "history becomes 
'effective' to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our very being--as it divides our emotions, 
dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against itself." ([1971] 1977: 88) In this context, 
the historically-riven "body" is not that of Foucault's individual subject, but the body governmental, the 
corporate self whose rationalities, emotions, instincts and ways of speaking, even when divided and set 
against themselves, are more than the sum of the interests they might individually represent.1 
 
By exploring the historicity of the sick outsider (l'etranger malade) and the governmental struggles to 
define the limits of medical hospitality, then, this experiment in defamiliarization aims to estrange the 
reader from acquired knowledges of the stranger as a transcendent figure, the ever-present remainder 
in humankind's ongoing reflection on and constitution of (it)self. In place of those universal narratives, 
this discussion of medical hospitality toward the stranger in nineteenth century France seeks to make 
fully visible the relationship between ethical questions and the constitution of modern governmental 
subjectivities by tracing the legislative and administrative operation of what Foucault has called 
elsewhere "the mode of subjection... that is, the way in which people are invited or incited to recognize 
their moral obligations." (1984b: 353) 
 
 
The Legal Geography of Responsibility and the Suffering Body 
  
During the nineteenth century, the problem of destitute and sick outsiders, along with the attendant 
administrative question of how and when to formally recognize a moral obligation to provide care for 
them, was framed within a national legal discourse that localized responsibility for the poor. In the first 
half of the century, hospital administrators and municipal officials were guided in their decision-making 
by the 1793 decree on the "extinction of mendicancy." (Duvergier [15 Oct. 1793] 1825, vol. 6: 283-88) 
The decree, crafted during the most radical phase of the French Revolution, took up the challenge of 
the revolutionaries' earlier investigation of poverty's implications for democratic political society. 
(Procacci 1993: 65-101) It outlined a wide-ranging program for the secular government of indigence, 
including the reorganization of public poor relief across France and the criminalization of begging.2 
Although many aspects of the revolutionary project were never realized or were dismantled by the early 
years of the nineteenth century, significant parts of it remained embedded in the rules and customs of 
administrative practice in post-revolutionary France. (Woloch 1994) 
 
The crucial passage of the 1793 decree for the general administration of aid to the poor in the first half 
of the nineteenth century was Title V: "du domicile de secours." This portion of the legal text remapped 
the geography of public assistance in France, defining the domicile de secours as "the place where the 
needy man has the right to receive public aid." Long-standing practice in medieval and early modern 
France, as in other European countries, had identified the parish as the primary terrain of localized 
responsibility and made the distribution of charitable aid a matter of Christian morals for the community, 
the individual donor, and the recipient. Hospitals, and the offer of institutional hospitality to poor 
strangers more generally, had also belonged above all to the world of religious devotion. (Hufton 1974: 
131-76) 
 
Beginning in the seventeenth century, French cities began to develop their own institutions of aid 
alongside the charity of church and parish, including hospitals for both mortally ill indigents and 
foundlings and poor houses for the institutional placement of those classified as beggars and vagrants. 
(Bloch 1908, Fairchilds 1976) It was not uncommon for local officials to draw the lines of eligibility for 
admission to these new establishments directly over municipal rather than parish boundaries, reserving 
the city's hospitality for its own residents rather than poor pilgrims or travelers. (Higgs 1973; 191) 
Overall, however, no strict division was drawn between urban and parochial charity in this period. As 
Woloch notes, municipal hospitals and other urban institutions for the poor embodied a complex 
amalgam of resources, personnel, and functions, frequently conjoining both city and church funding, 
intermixing secular and religious principles of organization and staffing, and conflating charitable aims 
with newer programs of surveillance and repression.3 (Woloch 1994: 238-42) 
 
The revolutionary decree of 1793 demanded in place of these hybrid practices and institutions a 
rationally-drawn system of borders that secularized both the administrative map and the meaning of the 
assistance provided within the spaces of social government it delimited. The new law specified that the 
"place where the needy man has the right to receive public aid" was the "commune," the smallest unit of 
municipal administration in revolutionary and post-revolutionary France, usually co-extensive with a city, 
town or village. (Woloch 1994: 31-36) The decree also elaborated a set of conditions that would 
establish the proper connection between locality and individual in a variety of imagined circumstances. 
 
The complexity of Title V suggests that the nature of that proper connection between individuals and 
administrative spaces had proven difficult to conceptualize. Following the often paradoxical logic of 
revolutionary civics (Wahnich 1997) as well as the signposts of accreted administrative custom, the 
decree simultaneously elaborated a vision of the rights of domicile that stressed birth and nature, and 
developed an alternative vision that represented the rights of domicile as negotiable: they could be 
acquired simply through the performance of proper civic behavior. According to this dual line of thought, 
the "natural site" of aid was, first, a person's place of birth. Up to age twenty-one, "all citizens could 
claim the rights of domicile without formality, in their place of birth." At the same time, however, the 
decree allowed that the rights of domicile de secours could be acquired by paths other than the natural. 
A person could establish legal residency after living in a commune for a year, for example, by marrying 
a legal resident and maintaining his own residency for at least six months, or by working as a servant in 
a town for at least two years. While the decree allowed municipal authorities the general right to refuse 
domicile to "vagrants," it required that those over the age of seventy who had no fixed domicile, along 
with those people who became infirm and unable to provide for themselves while waiting to fulfill the 
conditions of establishing a new domicile, be sent to the nearest home or hospice. 
 
The enumeration of the multiple ways of acquiring the legal right to local aid manifested within the body 
the decree a tangible anxiety about the very possibility of establishing a fixed and unique domicile de 
secours for every resident of France. Beginning with the ninth article, the problems of transfer, overlap, 
and duplicity--as well as the inescapable mobility of the population, and particularly the poor--disrupted 
the confident explication of domicile and the rights attaching to it. "He who leaves his domicile de 
secours to acquire a second one must fulfill the same formalities as for the first one." Article 10 
extended these conditions to people seeking to return to communes where they had previously 
established legal residency, and article twelve insisted that "one must retain his last domicile, so long as 
the delay required for the acquisition of the new one has not yet elapsed, and so long as one had 
properly registered in the new municipality." "No one," Article 11 declared vigorously, "may have the 
rights of domicile de secours in two communes simultaneously." Even the confidence in the principle of 
a natural domicile of birth was not as sturdy as it first appeared. "The child's place of birth," explained 
article three, "is the mother's usual domicile at the moment of birth." The "natural" order of natal 
domicile thus depended not on nature, but on patterns of maternal residency defined by the 
arbitrariness of everyday life. Further, the natural geography of aid mapped around children and their 
mothers ended at age of twenty-one. At that point in life, according to article nine, even those people 
living in their places of birth would be required to fulfill a residency requirement of six months and to 
register with the municipality before it would be considered their domicile de secours. 
 
Despite its vacillation between notions of domicile that assumed its natural foundation and those that 
centered on its social constitution, almost every article of the 1793 text stressed the importance of 
charting the allocation of public charity according to a grid of fixed or fixable residency. Yet in its 
eighteenth and final article, the decree made a crucial distinction between the "needy," who had to 
establish a proper domicile de secours where they could receive public aid, and the physically stricken 
poor. "Every sick person [malade] without resources, legal resident or not, will be aided, either at his de 
facto domicile or in the nearest hospital." In this portion of the decree, the special status that resulted 
from the combination of poverty with serious illness or injury --the term malade connoting both 
conditions of acute physical distress--severely undercut the logic of residency enumerated with such 
concern across the body of the revolutionary-era text. In its place, this final article articulated a vision of 
hospitality that opened the doors of municipal hospitals to every sick and destitute individual. Legal 
geography mattered only in determining the hospital in closest proximity to the suffering body, wherever 
that body happened to be. 
 
The 1793 decree thus both obsessively fetishized and refused the secular legal map of governmental 
hospitality and the geographical distribution of individual claims upon it. The effort to impose order on 
the possible multiplication of domiciles across time and space, along with the uncertainty about the 
relationship between aid, a natural geography of birthplace, and the inescapable mobility of the poor, 
resulted in a significant degree of indeterminacy in the statutory construction of a commune's obligation 
to offer charitable aid to the poor. The eighteenth article on admitting the sick or injured poor to the 
nearest hospital, "legal resident or not," imposed further interpretative complications by suggesting that 
when illness or injury clearly marked the bodies of the indigent, administrators ought not attend to the 
complex cartography of public aid at all. The decree's ambivalence about the normative order of 
localized responsibility--so evident in the tension between Article 18 and the rest of the text—would 
profoundly mark both the heterodoxy of administrative practice across France in the post-revolutionary 
period and the debates of mid-nineteenth century lawmakers intent on relocating the provision of 
hospital care to poor outsiders beyond the pale of revolutionary civics. 
 
 
"Truly Christian Charity" and the Civil Ontology of Disease 
  
Despite the repeated political repudiations of the Revolution during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, the 1793 decree remained in force as the legal text that governed the allocation of public 
hospital care to the poor. (de Watteville 1851) By the mid-nineteenth century, concerned legislators 
noted that local readings of the law had come to vary widely across France. In some towns and cities 
furnished with hospitals--still only an extremely small minority among French communes--officials 
strictly applied the more general rules of domicile de secours to the admission of nonresidents to their 
institutions, systematically refusing the special conditions described by Article 18. On the other hand, 
large cities such as Paris, Lyon, and Marseilles appeared to open their hospital doors to indigent 
outsiders without ever asking, as one lawmaker remarked in his approving description of hospital 
admissions in Lyon, "either where they had been or where they came from."4 (Moniteur universel 
[hereafter Moniteur], 6 April 1851) 
 
During the brief but turbulent years of the Second Republic, the Legislative Assembly devoted itself to 
rethinking the lines of obligation and right between the state and the poor. (Thiers 1850, Agulhon 1983) 
French lawmakers, still shaken by the revolutionary upheaval of 1848 and the radical challenges to 
social and political inequalities that issued from it, drafted a variety of new projects on aid to the needy 
between 1849 and 1851, including the reorganization of the administration of public assistance in Paris 
and a statute on the provision of public legal aid for indigent citizens pressing civil suits. (Duvergier 
1849, vol. 49: 6-7; 1851: 16-27) In keeping with the new government's growing interest in medicine and 
the regulation of health (Aisenberg 1999: 45-49), the capstone of these projects was the law of 7 
August 1851 on the organization and administration of public hospitals across France. (Duvergier 1851, 
vol. 51: 332-34) 
 
The 1851 hospital law, along with the parliamentary debates that preceded it, dramatically recast the 
conceptual and ethical foundations of government-sponsored medical hospitality. Refusing the 
radicalism of the French Revolution's promise of universal rights to hospital care and its recent 
reverberation in the 1848 revolution's experiments in the realm of social rights (Balch 1893, Agulhon 
1983), legislative discussions in 1850 and 1851 focused instead on ways of reconstituting the moral 
responsibilities of towns and local institutions of public aid through the transcription of Christian principle 
into secular law. According to the subcommittee on assistance, the essential principles of hospitality 
had long been undermined by the common but mistaken application of residency qualifications at the 
hospital door. The Legislative Assembly, it argued, must reconceive an ethical genealogy for the 
allocation of state-sponsored assistance that reached beyond the anti-clerical Revolution to the 
"original" exercise of hospitality as a Christian virtue. "The oldest and often the most well-endowed 
institutions were reserved for wayfarers and pilgrims," argued Representative de Melun, who presented 
the subcommittee's report and draft bill to the Legislative Assembly in late December 1850. (Moniteur, 
28 December 1850) "It was for the stranger, for the traveler in need of aid that people wanted to create 
a haven by providing him with hospitality, hospitium. It was this universal charity that embraced all 
people and all countries, and which, like the good Samaritan of the gospel, excluded no one." The 
assembly, he continued, should ensure that at least "a trace of our fathers' generosity" inform the 
modern administration of public assistance. "Let it not be said," de Melun pleaded, "that in France we 
require not only wounds and pain for admission to a hospital, but also the passports of those who 
suffer." 
 
Although de Melun invoked a Christian charity indifferent to the particular identity of the poor and 
suffering individual, his report nonetheless turned on giving the needy stranger a specific aspect. The 
face he placed on the body of the sick or injured outsider derived from the physiognomy of rural France. 
"Access to our hospitals," de Melun contended, "should no longer be denied to indigents from the 
countryside who, despite the text of the law [of 1793] and the formal intentions of more than one 
founder, are almost everywhere excluded from them." de Melun suggested further that towns owed a 
particular debt to peasants and the rural poor, "men who nourish the cities without sharing in the their 
advantages, who pay their taxes with work and blood since they form the large part of our army..." 
 
Few members of the conservative Assembly contested de Melun's reconstruction of the ethical frame 
for the secular legal regulation of public medical hospitality from the timbers of a pre-revolutionary 
Christian piety. Nor did they object to the rural specificity of de Melun's imagined stranger, particularly, 
perhaps, given the on-going agricultural crisis (Agulhon 1983: 84-5, Vigier 1967), the political volatility of 
the French peasantry in the early 1850s (Margadant 1979), and the increasing numbers of migrants 
who were leaving rural France for the city. (Juillard 1976) Putting a rustic face on the stranger, however, 
introduced into the legislative debates an awkward tension between the embrace of an undifferentiating 
spirit of hospitality and the justification of the call for legislative reform through the rhetorical conjuring of 
a quite particular--and particularly worthy--outsider. 
 
The 1851 statute did not in the end inscribe the rural specificity that subtended its general reflections on 
hospitality in the section on hospital admissions. Nonetheless, the tension between the universal and 
the specific--exemplified here in the legislature's compulsion to identify the stranger who, it had also 
insisted, should never have to produce his passport--surfaced elsewhere in the new law. Despite the 
deliberate invocation of a "universal" Christian charity that never rejected outsiders on the grounds of 
their foreignness, the 1851 legislation imposed more stringent formal restrictions on the identity of those 
people who might legitimately receive municipal medical hospitality than had Article 18 of the 1793 
decree. It did this above all by reconceiving the governmental meanings of illness itself. 
 
First, the new law stipulated that the nonresident poor should admitted only when their illnesses or 
injuries were deemed susceptible to treatment [curable]. According to this provision, the legal obligation 
to extend hospitality towards sick or injured strangers would henceforth depend in large part on whether 
admitting staff judged that the physical problems afflicting the poor outsider were both transitory and 
susceptible to medical intervention. In subsequent articles, the 1851 legislation tied these medicalized 
determinants of hospitality onto the older grid of localized responsibility. Municipal hospitals could 
legitimately refuse care to the chronically ill, the infirm and the aged who were officially domiciled in 
other communes, i.e., strangers who were not curable, although they might be admitted to local nursing 
homes if a set daily fee was paid. People with treatable but pre-existing conditions domiciled in 
communes too small to support their own institutions of care might similarly be admitted to hospitals in 
other towns, but again only so long as they, their families or the commune in which they were legally 
domiciled, agreed to pay the daily cost of in-patient hospital care. 
 
Even before it outlined the specific parameters of the illness or injury that would open the hospital door, 
with or without the pre-arrangement of payment, the 1851 law medicalized and circumscribed municipal 
hospitality through a subtle but deeply disruptive revision of Article 18. "When an individual without 
resources falls ill in a commune," the first article of the 1851 legislation stated, "no condition of domicile 
may be required for  his admission into the commune's hospital." Unlike the 1793 decree, which 
promised the right to care "in the nearest hospital" for all impoverished malades, article one of the new 
law offered municipal hospitality only to poor outsiders fortunate enough to "fall ill in a commune" large 
enough to be furnished with its own public hospital. By restricting the spirit of "universal charity" through 
this new focus on the spatially-situated and medically-specific onset of illness or exact moment of injury, 
the first article profoundly undercut both the revolutionary decree's broad attribution of rights to the poor 
and the new dream that the Second Republic's legal reinvention of hospital administration might find its 
ethical ancestor in a venerable and all-embracing hospitium. 
 
The idea that such restrictions might be accepted as consistent with even "a trace of [their] father's 
generosity" prompted outraged protests from several lawmakers involved in the first debates of the 
assistance subcommittee's report and draft bill in early 1851. Most vocal in this regard was Deputy 
Delebecque, who tried to rally support for maintaining the 1793 text as the law of the land. Quoting an 
1829 circular issued by the Ministry of the Interior on the correct interpretation of the older decree, 
Delebecque condemned the new bill's moral foundation: "'When a sick individual presents himself, 
whatever his own commune or department, we must not forget that it is in the spirit of our laws, as it is 
in the nature of our public mores, that all French people share in a community of aid..." By imposing the 
condition that the poor sick stranger must have fallen ill in a commune to be admitted to its hospital, 
Delebeque declared, the commission "had effaced this principle" of unrestrained generosity. "What I 
want," he insisted, "is not restricted charity, it is general charity, truly Christian charity." Deputy Chanay 
seconded Delebecque's call for "truly Christian charity" and extended its administrative meaning from 
the community of French people to the community of nations, citing with admiration the undifferentiating 
practice of admissions in Lyon, where Italians and Germans could be confident that they would 
admitted to the city hospital without reference to their foreign origins. (Moniteur 6 Apr. 1851) 
 
Delebecque was also the first to challenge the epistemological foundation of the first article, which 
already in draft form confined hospitality to those "falling ill in a commune." (Moniteur 28 Dec. 1850) "In 
certain cases," he explained to his colleagues in the Assembly, "it would be quite difficult to know where 
a sick person who appears at the hospital door had fallen ill." (Moniteur 6 Apr. 1851) Despite 
Delebecque's criticisms of both the spirit of the bill and the impossible knowledge project it seemed to 
require, the assembly voted to accept a version of article one that retained the requirement that poor 
strangers must fall ill within city limits to become eligible for municipal medical hospitality. 
 
Although he could not sway his colleagues in the assembly, Delebecque was not mistaken in noting the 
significance of the law's reorientation from the simple manifestation of illness of injury to an originary 
moment of spatially-specific physical crisis that seemed by definition to escape the reach of both 
governmental and medical ways of knowing. As local hospital administrators would argue later, the 
moment and place wherein an individual fell ill or was injured could often only be known indirectly, 
through the testimony of the patient or those who brought him to the hospital door. Predicating 
municipal hospitality on an inaccessible and inevitably narrative moment when bodily suffering began 
thus inscribed disturbing epistemological ambiguities within both the logic of the law and its broader 
implications for the government of mobile populations. In their effort to write Christian charity into 
secular law, French legislators replaced an undiscriminating faith centered on the care of the immortal 
soul with an already faltering hope that medical expertise could read both the physiological and civil 
truths of the stranger's afflicted body. 
 
In more general ways, the hospital law of 1851 produced a new kind of administrative disorientation. 
The first article's emphasis on the situated manifestation of critical illness or the moment of grave injury 
displaced familiar non-medical markers of identity and difference, obscuring both official and customary 
distinctions between French and foreign, the resident of the commune and the stranger. The 
epistemological difficulties arising from the new law's determination of local and strange through the 
onset of disease or the moment of injury also made brutally apparent the difficulty of apportioning 
charitable responsibility for an increasingly migratory population across a static administrative map. In 
this regard, the 1851 law captures a moment of conflicting governmental desires. In those articles 
requiring the exercise of communal responsibility for those whose illness or infirmity predated their 
travel to a city furnished with a hospital, the legislation reiterated an older dream that all of France might 
truly be divided into units of localized governmental responsibility to which people belonged for life. At 
the same time, the law superimposed a new way of fixing the identity of the "native" at a time when the 
rapidly increasing mobility of persons and diseases seemed to make the fixed borders of rational 
administration meaningless.5 In this vision, the onset of acute bodily trauma rather than birth or even 
long-term residency made an individual ethically and legally autochthonous to a locality. Paradoxically, 
the particular temporal and spatial manifestation of illness or of the occurrence of severe injury would 
now mitigate the condition of strangeness rather than produce it. In this way, the 1851 law required the 
erasure of strangeness through the embrace of an originary moment of physical suffering as the 
primary sign of localized indigenity. 
 
In administrative discourse, the new legal category of individuals "falling ill in a commune" would serve 
more to reshape the narrative order of hospital admissions than it would provide easily testable 
conditions that might rationally organize the triage of the sick and wounded who sought free hospital 
care in cities other than their own. For hospital administrators this narrative work entailed above all both 
the temporal and spatial domestication of the patient's foundational moment of identity, that is, the 
moment of crossing from well to unwell, the moment of becoming, to rewrite Sontag, citizens of this 
place. In the frame of the 1851 law, in other words, Sontag's metaphorical reading of the "civic" borders 
of illness also illuminates a literal meaning that reversed the poles of familiarity and strangeness. If 
illness naturalized people as citizens of a foreign place in metaphysical or spiritual terms, the law of 
1851 called for a second order of naturalization to be superimposed on the first: the municipally-
bounded manifestation of illness or injury would turn those doubly strange strangers--"foreign" in both 
their legal domicile and their state of health--into officially recognized locals. 
 
The 1851 legislation's dependence on this inaccessible moment of situated ontological transformation 
from well to ill and from stranger to "citizen" would prove difficult to assimilate into local administrative 
practice in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, the law's position on admitting 
the stranger who fell ill within municipal boundaries set the stage for new efforts to imagine the 
difference between outsiders and insiders, and provided as well a concrete legal foundation for an 
ethics of medical hospitality based on the erasure or occulting of difference through the narrative 
domestication of disease or grave injury. It both depended upon and negated an established geography 
of local responsibility, thus reconfiguring the possible meanings and ways of exercising municipal 
hospitality. In its implication that the ethics of public hospitality should stand on both legislative and 
moral ground, finally, the 1851 statute opened the way for local administrators chaffed by its 
restrictiveness to consider other ways of opening the hospital door to poor sick outsiders while keeping 
their practice fully under the sign of law. 
 
 
The Stranger at the Door 
  
Strangers were an inescapable part of everyday life in nineteenth century Marseilles. A port city on 
France's eastern Mediterranean frontier whose ancient foundation could be attributed to seafaring 
Greeks, Marseilles maintained a cosmopolitan orientation from its earliest days. (Baratier 1973, 
Busquet 1998) By the mid-nineteenth century, travelers of diverse backgrounds constituted a regular 
feature of city life. Some were European migrants passing through on their way to more distant 
destinations. Others were sailors in French and foreign fleets seeking temporary harbor and supplies. 
Marseilles served as well as a maritime gateway for soldiers and civilians on their way to and from 
France's colonies in North Africa, particularly Algeria, and as an important commercial center in the 
import and export of goods and materials. With the development of free trade policies in the 1850s and 
1860s, and with the 1869 opening of the Suez canal linking the Red Sea with the Mediterranean, 
Marseilles became ever busier as a port and drew to it ever larger numbers of outsiders. (Temime 
1990, vol. 2; Busquet 1998: 353-54) 
 
The complexity of strangeness in Marseilles emerges forcefully in the administrative language of the 
mid-nineteenth century. From the 1850s to the early 1870s the annual reports issued by the hospital 
administrative commission described the population treated in Marseilles' hospitals using an array of 
categories that both attended to and cut across familiar lines of identity. The report on the patients 
treated in 1858 at the main public hospital, for example, distributed the total among the following 
"nationalities": "Marseillais"; "French (from other cities)"; "subjects of the Kingdom of Sardinia"; and 
nationals of "other foreign states."6 French patients who were not from Marseilles made up the majority 
of the "malades etrangers" admitted that year, 58.13% of a total of 6270.  7 (ADBR 46 HD 292, 
CRAHCM, 4 June 1859, 74, table 9) 
 
Since foreigners--French and non-French--regularly made up the majority of indigent patients treated in 
Marseilles' public hospitals in the second half of the century, the question of the limits of medical 
hospitality came to be a particularly consuming preoccupation for urban officials. After the enactment of 
the 1851 hospital law, the destitute sick stranger emerged as one of the most potent discursive figures 
in both the reports and minutes issuing from the city's main governing body, the municipal council, and 
in the documents produced by the appointed commission overseeing the administration of public 
hospitals in the city. Indeed, the local debates about the care of the stranger almost always provoked 
multiple and contradictory expressions of Marseilles' legal, fiscal and ethical relationship to the needy 
outsider, contradictions apparent not only across and within the conversations generated by different 
institutions of municipal government and administration, but also even within individual contributions to 
the everyday discourse of governance. 
 
Above all, the question of the stranger emerged as local officials struggled to determine the city's 
proper, and properly authorized, geography of medical hospitality. How, members of these bodies 
asked each other, might Marseilles reconcile the open ethical map inspired by the desire to offer 
medical hospitality to every needy stranger--a moral ambition few were ready to disown completely in 
this period--with the array of more carefully-policed borders charted both by the 1851 legislation and the 
demands of sound fiscal policy? How might they negotiate these competing geographies of hospitality's 
frontiers while sacrificing neither their sense of moral duty to the stranger nor their obligation to uphold 
the law and maintain the economic health of the rapidly growing city? And if written law, and especially 
the law of 1851, did not satisfactorily map this terrain, could the city determine the appropriate extent of 
its hospitality through an appeal to a law of a different order? 
 
The records of Marseilles' municipal council and its hospital administration commission suggest that the 
tension between and within the multiplying visions of municipal hospitality surfaced quite soon after the 
passage of the 1851 law. Although the mayor of Marseilles contended in 1856 that an opposition 
between "the generous inspiration of charity and the severe exigencies of economy" fundamentally 
shaped the council's debates (AMM 1D  86, DCM, 18 Sept. 1856), the archives of municipal 
government suggest rather that even in the most cost-conscious account of the burden of medical 
hospitality, moral concerns inevitably informed the attempt to set limits on the provision of hospital care 
to poor outsiders. Similarly, those officials more interested in hospitality than in controlling the city's 
spending consistently went out of their way to justify the cost by producing, rhetorically at least, an 
extra-economic balance sheet. The conversations produced in these institutions of urban government, 
in other words, did not turn on a simple opposition between charity and economy, as the mayor 
suggested, but instead brought together diverse efforts to elaborate an economical ethics congruent 
with the members' equally diverse efforts to survey the moral landscape of municipal obligation in all its 
forms. 
 
The debates and reports of this period also reveal that the question of municipal obligation inspired a 
strong ambivalence about the lines of difference and exclusion drawn by the new hospital law. In an 
1855 report on the hospital budget, for example, one member of the municipal council noted with pride 
the way the city had managed both to increase its "charitable spirit" and to apply the new legislation so 
that administrators could "send away those parasitic strangers [etrangers parasites] who were seeking 
treatment in Marseilles..." (AMM 1 D 85, DCM, 17 Dec. 1855) By contrast, other councilors attempted to 
defend the provision of a hospitality towards poor strangers more expansive than the 1851 law required. 
"If, strictly speaking, Marseilles is in no way obliged to admit these patients," Councilor Roberty argued 
in 1856, 
 
can we not say that in certain ways, it cannot comfortably refuse them, since it profits in large part 
from the labor and production of surrounding communes? For a city as well one may say, 
noblesse oblige. Marseilles is a large and wealthy city, and to close the doors of its hospital to the 
sick from neighboring communes who are attracted by its long-standing reputation for charity, 
above all to those who need surgical procedures these same communes cannot provide, is to do 
something that is not very charitable, not very honorable. (AMM 1 D 86, DCM, 18 Sept. 1856) 
 
For Roberty, the obligation to provide a medical hospitality that extended even to people with pre-
existing conditions, such as those outsiders in need of non-emergency surgery, called Marseilles to 
step beyond the limits of the law. The cost to the city, he thus proposed, should be weighed not in terms 
of the economic burden of the sick stranger, but in terms of the advantages produced by the outsider; 
the poor stranger's relationship to the city should not be seen as parasitic, but symbiotic. 
 
Marseilles' interest in medical hospitality, however, lay only partly in the calculations of wealth and its 
production. The heart of Roberty's discussion of hospitality was configured by the language of urban 
self-esteem. Withholding hospitality, Roberty suggested, would be far more costly to the city's honor 
than providing it would be to its material resources. In addition, "closing the [hospital] doors" unjustly 
punished those drawn to the city by the very reputation it sought to preserve and enhance in the mid-
nineteenth century. By reading medical hospitality as the sign of municipal greatness, measured both in 
terms of wealth and honor, the councilor drew an extra-legal ethical map that bound Marseilles to its 
"foreign" neighbors by lines of economic interdependence, noble responsibility, mutual comfort, and 
irresistible public image. This plan, unlike the map of "strict obligation" generated by the 1851 law, 
charted the multiple ways the municipal "self" might be called to its moral duties and, in turn, might be 
constituted in the eyes of the stranger by the manner in which it attempted to answer that call. 
 
At the same time that Councilor Roberty traced the boundaries of hospitality onto the profile of 
municipal self-image and honor, he also attempted to solve the vexing problem of the outsider's lack of 
a specific identity by restricting his concern to a middle terrain of strangeness: the ground of the 
neighbor. Neither wholly known nor fully foreign, the category of the neighbor recalled without naming 
the dictates of a Christian charity that demanded an ethical equivalence between one's neighbor and 
one's self. The figure of the neighbor thus allowed Roberty to stake the city's reputation on the embrace 
of a stranger who, in the end, might be understood as distinct from those who did not meet this test of 
second-order indigenity. 
 
Yet the neighbor could also be as much or more an object of municipal ambivalence as the out-and-out 
stranger. Councilor Martin, for example, stressed the burden incarnate in the neighboring outsider who 
illegitimately preyed on Marseilles' native hospitality. A large number of people sought treatment in 
Marseilles, Martin argued in 1856, who came from "neighboring departments," and "even from Africa 
and Constantinople; unless we are to turn Marseilles' hospital into a poor house," he contended, "it 
would be better to put an end to this invasion..." (AMM 1 D 86 DCM, 18 Sept. 1856) Mirroring the logic 
of the categories used to enumerate the population of patients admitted to marseilles' hospitals, Martin's 
remarks elided the difference between French and non-French outsiders, developing a metaphor of 
invasion that placed Marseilles in mortal opposition to its "neighbors" near and far. 
 
Making the outsider more familiar, if not always more welcome, by circumscribing the disputed domain 
of medical hospitality to neighboring towns, departments and countries, was not the only approach to 
mitigating the stranger's anonymity at the local level, nor did it provide the only coordinates for mapping 
a ethically acceptable terrain for the exercise of municipal hospitality after 1851. A second line of 
reasoning charted the proper extent of Marseilles' hospitality according to the dictates of a universal 
humanity. Attempting to embarrass those who sought to impose more stringent limits on the city's care 
of outsiders, one member characterized the municipal council as a body unequivocally committed to 
"humanity" and the open-border policies it presumed. Rather than seeking to empty beds in the 
hospital, he argued in 1856, the council in fact wished to see "that all indigent patients are admitted, as 
in the past, every time it is in conformity with the rules or humanity requires it..." (AMM 1D 86, DCM, 18 
Sept. 1856) Councilor Martin, also argued that humanity--rather than the law--regularly determined 
whether strangers in need of the most urgent care would be admitted. "These patients have always 
been admitted," he argued, "whether they show up day or night, and the hospital administration would 
rather sacrifice money than fail to observe the laws of humanity." (AMM 1D 88, DCM, 12 Dec. 1859) 
 
The sense that a higher moral law superseded national law was echoed in the minutes of Marseilles' 
hospital administrative commission. In an 1855 letter to the departmental prefect, the commission 
declared that "Every time there is an emergency the sick are admitted even if they had fallen ill outside 
city limits." (ADBR 46 HD 292, CRAHCM 26 Apr. 1856, 79) Rather than stressing the indigenity 
conferred by the localized onset of disease, the commission argued that its ethic of medical hospitality 
must respond first to the pathos of the destitute sick wayfarer. "Marseilles, because of its location, is 
vulnerable to being visited by great numbers of travelers coming from all countries," the commission 
noted in an 1861 report. "Among these travelers there are many who are indigent and who arrive so 
sick that it is impossible to refuse to admit them, even though their illnesses were not contracted in 
Marseilles..." (ADBR 46 HD 293, CRAHCM, 14 Aug. 1861, 10) 
 
Most crucial for their defense of a practice that did not conform with the 1851 legislation, the invocation 
of a door-opening humanity allowed councilors and hospital administrators to pit the moral power of 
affect against the unfeeling law, particularly when the hospital threshold provided the stage for an 
emotion-rousing spectacle of suffering. In 1859, for example, Councilor Roux defended the hospitals' 
practice of admitting gratis needy strangers with pre-existing conditions by opposing Marseilles' regional 
noblesse to the law's callous indifference in a narrative celebration of administrative sensitivity: 
 
Marseilles is surrounded by poor communes, denuded of resources; when their sick come, 
exhausted, to knock on the doors of our hospitals, it sometimes happens that, armed with the 
law, you refuse them; but at other times you allow the heart to speak and you admit them 
because you don't have the strength to let them die on the hospital doorstep. Who would dare to 
make this the administration's crime? (AMM 1D 88, DCM, 12 Dec. 1859) 
 
The local celebration of a humanity that engaged the emotions and superseded national law continued 
well into the 1860s. "Morals [les moeurs] are always more powerful than laws," argued Councilor Fabre 
in his report on the hospital budget in 1863. "Among laws there is one that dominates all from the 
heights of its divine virtue: humanity." Like Roux before him, Fabre also turned to the imagery of the 
hospital threshold and the awakening of affect that occurred there. Unlike Roux, however, Fabre 
focused less on the administration's heart than on the public emotions that might be roused by the 
spectacle of the administration's apparent inhumanity if it were to turn poor suffering strangers away. 
"Mark my words," he warned, "public pity would not long endure this spectacle of pain and agony, and 
the police, at that point more compassionate than us, would know well how to make us open our doors." 
(AMM 1 D 93, DCM, 11 Dec. 1863) Rather than unlocking the hospital door from the inside, pity and 
compassion would here threaten to force admission from without. Hospitality would not be freely 
offered, but compelled, either by the lawlessness of the outraged public, or by local law-enforcement's 
efforts to restore public order by addressing the institutional source of the disturbance. 
 
The high drama in which the 1851 law confronted humanity at the hospital threshold played with similar 
force in the imagination of the hospital administration commission. In his report of 1869, for instance, 
the president of the commission argued strenuously that Marseilles must "[bend] the text of the law" as 
humanity required. To describe the affective engagement of this humane sensibility, this administrator 
painted his own nightmarish scenario of foreign suffering at the hospital threshold. Imagine, he 
suggested to his colleagues, "a man afflicted with a terrible illness contracted in a place he no longer 
inhabits. But now he is sick and indigent, stripped of everything, without shelter. Must we leave him to 
groan and perish on a doorstep? Humanity does not permit it..." In his narrative of the conflict between 
the letter of the law and the call of hospitality, the president also conceded that fear might open the 
hospital door if administrative humanity alone did not, particularly where negative public opinion and the 
possibility of popular violence threatened to bend the law to the breaking-point. "If the hospital resists 
admitting him," he noted, "passers-by gather and spew injurious remarks about the administration's 
rigidity, a misinterpreted rigidity, but one which yields in the face of scandal, the commission not being 
sufficiently protected by the agents of the higher authorities in this instance." (ADBR 46 HD 293, 
CRAHCM, 19 Oct. 1869, 11-12) As members of the municipal council had argued earlier that the 
extension of medical hospitality beyond the geographical and ontological limits imposed by the 1851 
legislation was essential to the preservation of municipal honor, so the president of the commission 
suggested that the reputation of the hospital administration would be made or broken by its response to 
the agony of alien physical torment and collective local anger enacted at the hospital doorstep. 
 
In their multiple efforts to map hospitality's passionate domain against the cool grid of the 1851 
legislation, Marseilles officials thus repeatedly sought to elaborate a local practice that would be fully 
licit even where it committed the city to a generosity that exceeded the boundaries of the written law. 
The laws of humanity, they argued again and again in these two decades, authorized the development 
of an admission policy far more satisfying than the one determined by the law of the Legislative 
Assembly seated in Paris. Yet these officials were also divided within and among themselves by a 
powerful ambivalence about the implications of humanity's rule and the meaning of emotion in a project 
of governance supposedly ordered by strength and reason. 
 
First, the rhetoric of local government in Marseilles of the 1850s and 1860s repeatedly revealed the fear 
that "allowing the heart to speak" or responding to the humane passions of the crowd might produce a 
condition of administrative lawlessness. The extra-legal rule of emotion threatened to brand their 
obedience to the laws of humanity as "criminal." Second, as the municipal council and the hospital 
commission expressed their concerns about criminality, they also revealed a deeper concern about the 
way both "allowing the heart to speak" and strict obedience to the law suggested that truly ethical 
government might be a matter of emotional weakness rather than moral strength. Their conversations 
suggested that the mores of humanity were not "always more powerful than law," but instead left 
officials unwilling to endure the discomfort of refusing to admit the suffering and without "the strength to 
let [the sick outsider] die on the hospital doorstep." Should they try to enforce the law and close the 
door to those strangers with pre-existing conditions, on the other hand, they would not have the 
strength to resist the "more compassionate" police, nor would they be protected from the irate pity of the 
Marseilles public. In this way, both municipal medical hospitality and the maintenance of public order 
seemed to rest upon an affective and governmental frailty that left urban officials powerless to resist the 
call of the heart and equally powerless to keep the peace if they enforced the law. 
 
In Marseilles, then, the law of 1851 inspired new and profoundly dissonant visions of urban ethics and 
municipal order. Disoriented in the new terrain of medical hospitality, councilors and hospital 
administrators combined stories of economic calculation, neighborliness, nobility, and humanity's 
irresistible imperatives with tales of fear, vulnerability and a sentimentality virtuous in its weakness. In 
telling these stories, officials recharted the terrain of hospitality and the place of the stranger in it. Most 
significantly, they repeatedly relocated the critical line of admission from the city limit to the threshold of 
the hospital itself. It was here, in the discourse of municipal medical hospitality, that urban officials could 
grant the law of humanity its full jurisdiction, and here that the abstract invocation of humanity could be 
narrativized in specific renderings of suffering and sentiment. And it was here, finally, that the 
institutions of local government were most fully "incited to recognize [their] moral obligations," and so 
were fully constituted as (divided) ethical subjects both in their own eyes and in the eyes of all those 
who observed and regulated their actions. 
 
 
Figuring the Ethical Limit and the Unfamiliar Stranger 
  
Attending to the imagery of the threshold is crucial for understanding the place and meaning of both 
hospitality and strangeness in the everyday life of urban governance. In midnineteenth century 
Marseilles, the threshold gave form not to a rigid administrative or legal limit but to a multidimensional 
ethical frontier. It was, in its metaphorical constitution, a site of liminality and ambivalence, 
simultaneously open and closed, an open stage for melodramas of popular emotion but also the 
administrative heart's inevitably public anteroom. The trope allowed the municipal councilors and 
administrators to represent the sick strangers who appeared at the hospital door as "outside" in both 
literal and jurisdictional terms, but also to argue that they were in fact already inside the boundaries of 
municipal hospitality--and so within humanity's jurisdiction--whenever their appearance on the threshold 
engaged the eye and the sentiments. 
 
At the same time, the threshold described a different imaginary space of hospitality, one conditioned by 
a double threat of violence. First, it situated and gave concrete form to anxieties about the ways the law 
of humanity--and the erasure of legally valid categories of difference--might be imposed from without 
though the force of popular sentiment and police action. Second, and of equal significance, it figured 
officials' concerns about their own administrative violence, about the death sentence imposed on the 
weak and suffering stranger by means of the closed door. While scholars have reflected at length on 
the law's violence, particularly as enacted through the interpretation of criminal law, or on law as the 
expression of a legitimate, organized state violence more generally, (see esp. Cover, 1992)8 in this 
instance, the problem of violence emerged in the arena of administrative interpretation. It inhered in the 
practice of exclusion from the subjects of municipal medical hospitality, rather than in the inclusion 
among those subjected to the state's domination and its regimes of correction or punishment. It 
signaled a lethal negligence born of the law's indifference, rather than the violence of a justice 
interested in social order and public safety. 
 
The imagined scenes of violent confrontation at the hospital doorstep over the body of the suffering 
stranger thus allowed Marseilles' officials in the 1850s and 60s to give dramatic realization to the 
internal and external conflicts of conscience in which they found themselves. In the last three decades 
of the nineteenth century, these concerns about the poor sick stranger and the hospitality one offered in 
his or her direction would take new forms as the national border seemed increasingly to mark the most 
critical political and cultural boundaries between "foreigners" and citizens. A national law passed in 
1893 further hardened the primary identification of strangers with non-nationals by requiring the 
provision of free medical care to all impoverished French people, but also left local officials pondering 
the possible difference between "every individual falling ill within a commune"--the object of the still-in-
force 1851 law--and the apparently exclusive "all French people" of the new legislation. With these new 
conditions, the trope of the threshold would yield to new ways of figuring the space and operation of 





What is there to learn from the particular story of the stranger in France of the 1850s and 60s? What 
might those interested in law, strangeness, and hospitality more generally draw from this specific 
moment in the French past? I have not sought here to recuperate lost models of legislative action or 
administrative imagination that might serve as templates for the present, although some readers may 
find inspiration in the traces of an apparently strong investment in humanity or in the effort to instantiate 
a spirit of public charity that might truly be blind to those lines of difference that so often determine 
whether doors open or close. Nor has my aim been to rehabilitate the lawmakers, municipal councilors 
and hospital administrators of this period, most of them otherwise notable for their collusion in a post-
revolutionary regime of political repression, as heroes for present-day emulation. Instead, I would argue 
that the detailed examination of the constitution and implications of the stranger in this time and place 
affords a valuable opportunity to consider how powerful and particular forms of strangeness might be 
produced in the most apparently ordinary kinds of legislative action. It also makes visible the ways that 
legislated abstractions of strangeness and its mitigation might operate locally and specifically, and 
opens vantages onto an administrative negotiation of those abstractions that not only invoked a 
language of feeling--a gesture rarely absent in contemporary politics--but explicitly and openly relied 
upon it for organizing governmental positions and policies. In this sense, the story of the poor sick 
stranger in mid-nineteenth century France suggests that we would be mistaken to overlook the ways 
the supposed rationalities of governance might be fundamentally organized by compassion, desire, and 
fear in ways that are not captured in current discussions of enlightened responsibility or xenophobic 
prejudice. 
 
The discussion of the outsider and the multiple, sometimes contradictory bids in this period to chart the 
terrain of responsibility correctly also signals how our own, now almost reflexive familiarity with the 
stranger may serve to trap even the most generous among us in a one-dimensional ethical obligation 
toward "the other" that remains blind to the specific and multiple anxieties that the collect upon and 
radiate from this figure. This obligation may move us, for example, to defend the stranger against 
generic charges of deviance or criminality, common themes in the anti-immigration discourse of the 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, while encouraging us to ignore the ways that openness 
toward the stranger might also produce disturbing--and often politically powerful--subliminal visions of 
our own criminality or of the violence that the practice of hospitality might paradoxically entail. 
Overlooking the hidden imaginary that lines official enunciations of the obligation to be hospitable may 
well limit understanding of how the government of the stranger in western democracies truly operates, a 
matter of ever-increasing importance in an era of fallen walls, transnational political communities, and 
accelerating flows of immigrants from eastern and southern regions of the world. 
 
As this inquiry into France of the 1850s and 60s might usefully alienate us from common 
understandings of how governmental thinking (or feeling) works, so too might it defamiliarize the 
stranger in productive ways. First, it makes apparent that the specific lineaments of official strangeness 
not only shift across time and place, but that they might be traced over a variety of distinctions, such as 
"not of Marseillais 'nationality'" or "fallen ill elsewhere," that bear little resemblance to common 
presumptions about what makes--and has made--strangers into "others." At the same time, these 
discussions surrounding the legislation and administration of municipal medical hospitality also serve to 
remind us of the profound discomfort that the fully strange stranger can generate in governmental 
bodies, within governmental selves. Efforts to mitigate strangeness abound in this historical moment, 
from the identification of the stranger as one's neighbor to the attempt to naturalize outsiders as 
"citizens of this place" through the recognition of localized disease or injury. The question of the 
stranger in mid-nineteenth century France thus seems to suggest that governmental ethics of hospitality 
might often be riven by the need for both disorientating alterity, the prerequisite of "true charity," and a 
strategy of domestication that might provide assurance that the stranger is not so strange after all. 
 
Finally, the instance of mid-nineteenth century France foregrounds the way that the problem of the 
stranger may become most visible in the tension between governmental disorientation and the 
strategies of location, particularly the repeated mapping of the limits of responsibility. The importance of 
geography, both literal and figurative, is perhaps not surprising given that the stranger is so often first 
identified as someone "not from here," however "here" and the condition of being "from" might be 
defined. Yet in the specificity of the geographies generated in order to "place" the stranger and so 
situate him or her in a variety of legislative, administrative and ethical landscapes, students of 
difference, hostility and welcome might find as well that the stranger on the horizon is not always the 
one we think we know, and that meaningful frontiers of inclusion and exclusion may lie where the 
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1 In conceiving of government in these terms, this essay draws upon a Foucauldian notion of 
"governmentality" as elaborated and developed in the collections edited by Burchell et al (1991) and 
Barry et al (1996). 
 
2 Procacci (1993: 37-41) suggests that the modern government of poverty was inspired at least in part 
by official desires to contain "vagrants"--a category that inspired growing fears about the fragility of 
public order over the course of the eighteenth century. See also Farge and Revel. (1991: 29-50) 
 
3 Hufton also notes this collapsing of boundaries noting that by the eighteenth century, people seeking 
parish relief often also had to meet municipal residency requirements. (1974: 143, 166) 
 
4 Due to the irregular pagination of the Moniteur, citations are most effectively located by date. 
 
5 On the mobility of disease in the mid-nineteenth century and the strategies of regulation it inspired, 
see Francois Delaporte (1986). Aisenberg (1999) also addresses the crossing anxieties about the 
mobility of individuals and diseases, especially in relation to immigrants and vagrants. 
 
6 The kingdom of Sardinia in the first half of the nineteenth century included the island of Sardinia and 
the regions of Italy directly abutting the French border, including Piedmont and Savoy and the city of 
Nice. Italy ceded Savoy and Nice and its surrounding territory to France in 1860, redrawing the French-
Italian border at the conclusion of the wars of unification. 
 
7 Italians from the Kingdom of Sardinia comprised another 24.19% or 1517, with Italians from other 
regions accounting for another 129 patients. (ADBR 46 HD 292, CRAHCM, 4 June 1859, 74, table 9) 
 
8 Cover also notes but does not explore the violent consequences of property law and other civil 
actions that might involve punitive sanctions. (1986: 1607, n.16) 
